Monetary policy is a blunt instrument with which to smooth aggregate volatility. I demonstrate that there is actually very little correlation between how much real state income responds to monetary policy and to shocks that prompt aggregate smoothing by the Federal Reserve. This mismatch turns out to be strong enough to imply that while monetary policy might have reduced the variance of aggregate output in the US over the last three decades, it has actually increased the variance of output in a majority of states. Moreover, policy rules that minimize aggregate variance are not equal in the severity of distortions they create in the volatility of state income. Optimal rules that place more weight on price variance typically create the largest distortions while those that place weight on aggregate income volatility create the smallest. In the end, monetary policy has the potential to create large distortions, but need not do so.
Introduction
Monetary policy is the primary tool in advanced economies for smoothing business cycles. In the United States the central bank has been charged under the Federal Reserve Act with the objectives of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. While the Federal Reserve has generally attempted to achieve these objectives by smoothing fluctuations in economic aggregates, it is possible that the aggregate economy is not the right unit of analysis when designing or evaluating monetary policy.
The aggregate economy is made up of potentially heterogeneous regions, each of which has its own response to the policy instrument and to the fluctuations that prompt aggregate smoothing by the central bank. When the correlation between how policy affects a region with how the shocks to be smoothed affect a region is low, a number of regions might not benefit very much -or may even suffer -under aggregate smoothing by the central bank. In this sense an exclusive focus by the central bank on economic aggregates might be inappropriate.
To fix ideas, consider an economy with two regions. Imagine a shock that affects the Eastern region and a policy instrument that largely operates through the Western region. Any aggregate smoothing of this shock increases volatility in the West and only affects the East indirectly through its linkages with the other region. The inability of the central bank to channel the impact of monetary policy in the affected region implies that aggregate smoothing actually weakly increases volatility in every region of the economy. 1 This is of course an extreme example, but does illustrate that there could be an important difference between smoothing aggregate and regional volatility.
Developing evidence on the possible size of this difference is the primary task of this paper.
One might think that this issue is irrelevant in an economy as integrated as the United States. In the context of European integration, Frankel and Rose (1998) have argued that the large observed differences in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy across countries will become irrelevant as financial institutions converge over time. It's also likely that the free flow of goods and factors across borders facilitates the transmission of shocks across regions. On the other hand, integration could lead to specialization within regions that creates differences in industrial structure. 2 There is evidence that early monetary unions such at Italy, Germany, and the US have been correlated with increasing industrial specialization. 3 Differences in industrial structure alone could generate 1 By creating a negative covariance between the two regions, volatility can actually increase in each region while aggregate volatility falls.
2 See, for example, Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1980) . 3 See Grauwe and Vanhevebeke (1994) and Krugman and Venables (1996) .
differences in the transmission mechanism and in regional response to shocks.
Carlino and Defina (1998) have in fact documented that there are significant differences in the response of state income growth to changes in the federal funds rate and that much of the crosssectional variation in this response is explained by differences in state industrial structure. The simple existence of variation across regions in the response to monetary policy is not enough by itself, however, to break the link between aggregate and regional smoothing. Differences in the response of regional output to policy may simply reflect differences in the sensitivity of regional output to the aggregate economy so that the smoothing of aggregate and regional volatility are one and the same. When either monetary policy or the shocks that monetary policy is smoothing have differential effects on regional growth directly, independent of any differences in the sensitivity to aggregate growth, there is no longer necessarily a connection between the smoothing of aggregate and regional volatility. This small correlation has important implications for when evaluating the performance of actual monetary policy over the last three decades. I demonstrate below that the estimated policy rule seems to have reduced the variance of aggregate output relative to policy of holding interest rates constant. On the other hand, the actual steady-state variance of output has increased for a majority of states representing at least half of the economy, implying that aggregate smoothing has largely been accomplished by generating negative a covariance in output across the states. 4 The system includes the log of commodity prices, the federal funds rate, the log of aggregate income, the log of consumer prices, the consumer confidence index, and the log of income for U.S. states. This system is identified through the assumptions that the funds rate affects other variables only with a lag, confidence affects every variable except the funds rate with a lag, and commodity prices do not respond immediately to other variables. Moreover, I assume that state income depends only on aggregate variables and own lags so that spillovers across states are channeled through aggregate income. 5 The correlation of state income response to the funds rate versus commodity price innovations is -0.02 while the correlation versus consumer confidence is 0.16. These difference persist at longer lags, being 0.08 and 0.15 after 8 quarters. When characterizing the set of policies that minimize the steady-state variance of prices and income, macroeconomists have generally found trade-offs between these two objectives. 6 Estimates of the policy rules actually used by the Federal Reserve have generally indicated that these rules are sub-optimal in the sense that the variance of both inflation and output growth could be reduced through a change in policy. As more recently estimated policy rules have seemed to move in this direction, it may seem like central bank performance is improving. 7 I demonstrate, however, that while a shift towards a Taylor rule for monetary policy would certainly reduce the variance of both aggregate output and prices, such a policy change continues to increase state volatility, although most often for states that represent a small fraction of the economy. All optimal rules are not equal in the severity of distortions they create, however, as those that place more weight on price volatility tend to increase the volatility of state income for a significant fraction of the economy. Section 2 outlines the economic model and VAR estimation, while Section 3 outlines some reduced-form evidence. Section 4 characterizes the central bank's optimization problem and solution. Section 5 highlights results under the barest of assumptions, while Section 6 explores the robustness of these results in several dimensions.
Reduced-Form Evidence
The analysis below is going to require a great deal of structure on the data, so I am going to take a quick look at some correlations from a very reduced-form point of view to start. I first demonstrate there is a correlation between times when monetary policy is actively used and the dispersion of state income gaps, and then demonstrate that there is also a correlation between the time series volatility of state income gaps and the use of monetary policy. While I do not interpret either of these correlations as casual, they illustrate that the first-order correlations exist to back up the main message of this paper: monetary policy has the potential to create serious real distortions.
If the response of state income to monetary policy is as poorly correlated with the response to other types of shocks as was suggested above, it seems plausible that the use of monetary policy should increase the dispersion of state income. I look for this particular correlation in Table (1) through a regression of the quarterly state income gap, measured as state income growth minus its period mean, on current and lagged measures of the use of monetary policy since 1969. As 6 For example, see Taylor (1979) and Defina, Stock, and Taylor (1996) 7 Taylor (1993) illustrates that the federal funds rate in the 1980s closely tracked a simple optimal policy rule, while Taylor(1996) documents the mistakes of policy in the 1960s and 1970s. both increases and decreases the funds rate should increase the dispersion, I use as a regressor alternatively the absolute value of changes in the funds rate and the squared change in the funds rate. In order to control for other time-series shocks that might be correlated with the use of monetary policy, I include current and lagged values of aggregate income growth. The table clearly indicates through positive coefficients on all lags of the funds rate that the use of monetary policy seems to increase the dispersion of state income gaps using either measure. F-tests for the joint significance of the monetary policy variables reject the hypothesis that they are zero at conventional significance levels.
That monetary policy increases the dispersion of income gaps is troubling, but would not be important if it was simply reducing the volatility of all state income gaps in an asymmetric manner.
Estimating counterfactual income volatility is especially difficult without putting more structure on the data, but as a first-pass I split the sample into 16 eight-quarter time periods. Volatility is defined as the time-series standard deviation of the quarterly state income gap over each of these two-year time periods. I regress the time-series volatility of state income gaps on the measures of changes in monetary policy over the time period, using the sum of absolute value of the changes in the funds rate or the sum of squared changes in the funds rate alternatively. I control for a time trend and for aggregate income gap volatility. The table is clear, demonstrating that the use of monetary policy is correlated with higher volatility in state income gaps. I should restate that this should not be interpreted in a causal sense, as monetary policy could simply be used in times when state income volatility is high. These exercises are only suggestive, but indicate that the use of monetary policy is at least correlated with more disperse and more volatile state income gaps.
Model and Estimation
Consider an economy described by the economic variables z t which include at first the log of aggregate income, the log of prices, and the log of income for each of 51 states. 8 The central bank has at its disposal one policy instrument x t which will be either the federal funds rate in the spirit of Bernanke and Blinder (1992) or the log of money supply . I assume throughout this paper that these instruments cannot be used simultaneously as the primary mechanism though which the central bank exercises control over the funds rate -intervention in the reserves market -is the same one through which it exerts pressure on the money supply. 9
Volatility in non-policy variables is generated by a sequence of serially and mutually uncorrelated innovations v z t . For the analysis below I define Y t as the vector of economic variables z t x t and v t as the vector of shocks v z t v x t . Innovations in policy v x t occur in practice, and are in fact necessary to identify the effect of policy on the economy, but should not occur when the optimal rule is employed. 10 I assume that the economy has a linear structure, described by the following system of equations,
where:
Note that the coefficient γ xx as well as the diagonal elements of the submatrix γ zz are zero.
When invertible, this economy has the following quasi-reduced form representation,
Without further restrictions on economic structure, there is correlation across equations in e t as each of the reduced-form residuals is a linear function of all of the structural shocks. 12 While
are predetermined variables, x t is potentially endogenous due to a correlation with e t . In order to identify φ 0 , the immediate impact of monetary policy on non-policy variables, I
follow Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) with the assumption that monetary policy only affects non-policy variables with a lag but can react immediately to current non-policy variables.
This assumption is convenient because it implies that the quasi-reduced form in equation (3) can be estimated directly by OLS. 13 Given consistent estimates of φ, the central bank can simply use equation (3) to trace out the future path of policy and non-policy variables in response to a vector of innovations e t even without knowledge of the underlying structural parameters of the when conducting counterfactual policy exercises like the ones implemented below. Sargent and Wallace (1975) argue that monetary policy is irrelevant when agents have rational expectations, while Taylor (1979b) shows that with fixed contracts and rational expectations monetary policy can have real effects. 12 For those that are thinking too far ahead, the policy variable xt is included in Yt at this point only to estimate the actual policy rule used by the central bank over the sample period, and will be removed from the system below when formulating the optimal policy rule. 13 If there was an underlying structural model of the economy complete with rational expectations, there would be restrictions across equations on the coefficients that could be exploited in estimation. While imposing these restrictions could improve efficiency over OLS if the model is correct, the estimator could be inconsistent if the underlying model is incorrect. This is of course the perfect environment in which to evaluate a structural model through a Hausman specification test. For some reason, the literature has avoided testing these restrictions. There is of course an unfortunate Catch-22 here. If these restrictions matter in the sense that the estimated parameters vary greatly from those estimated from OLS, the underlying structural model can be rejected. On the other hand, if the restrictions don't matter in this sense then OLS equation by equation is not such a bad thing to do and a structural model is unnecessary. While Taylor (1979a) imposes these cross-equation restrictions to impose rational expectations on the data, there is really no need to do so, and imposing these restrictions may yield biased estimates if exectations are not rational or the underlying macro model not specified correctly. Given the large costs of imposing potentially false restrictions on the data and the relatively small benefits of doing so, I prefer to ignore these restrictions and thus do not specify a structural model. The first step is to estimate the quasi-reduced form system from equation (3) The main data constraint is the availability of state personal income, which only goes back to the first quarter of 1969.
The baseline system of equations includes the federal funds rate, the log of aggregate real I have performed unit root tests on each of the 54 variables included in this system, finding each one is integrated of order one and that log prices has two unit roots. Despite these unit roots, I choose to keep the system in levels to ensure monetary policy is neutral in the long run in the simplest manner possible. 15 I also use four lags of each variable in the system, finding that 14 State income could depend on non-policy aggregate variables contemporaneously, but in transforming the system from (1) to (3) these variables do not appear in the estimating equation. 15 Carlino and Defina (1998) have done most of their related work by taking appropriate differences, but permit this is sufficient to eliminate any first-order serial correlation in the estimated residuals. I finally use the residuals of the estimated equations in order to estimate the covariance matrix V of u t , imposing the identifying assumption that the innovation to monetary policy is uncorrelated with other residuals.
The response of the funds rate and aggregate income to a 100 basis point innovation is illustrated in Figures (3) and (4). The peak response on aggregate income is about 80 basis points after three years and monetary policy is neutral after about 10 years. Figure (5 ) illustrates the differences in how the funds rate affects state income over time. The aggregate response is displayed with the series of circles, and the response at each of the 50th, 25th, and 10th percentiles is illustrated by triangles, squares, and a line, respectively. What is striking about the figure is that states at or below the 25th percentile react very differently from other states. This monetary contraction has still reduced state income by 1 percent after 10 years at the 25th percentile while the effect at the 50th percentile then is basically zero. This is a crucial point which probably drives many of the results below.
Optimal Monetary Policy
The problem for the central bank is to choose a sequence for the policy variable that minimizes its loss function. In order to reduce the algebraic complexity of the optimization problem described below, it is convenient to re-write this system in first-order autoregressive form.
This is simply equation (3) stacked above a vector of equations requiring Y t−j = Y t−j for j = 1, 2, 3. Under the assumption that monetary policy affects other variables with a lag the policy instrument x t is either the lag of the funds rate or the log of lagged money supply. The coefficient matrix B consistent with this system has the following form, monetary policy to have long-run effects on the real economy. I feel this is an unfair place to start in a paper trying to gauge the size of distortions created by monetary policy as the conventional prior is that policy is neutral I the long-run. Moreover, this differencing is not necessary for consistency of OLS, but may affect our ability to conduct inference. See Hamilton (1994) for a full discussion of this issue. The weakness of staying in levels is that it will not be possible to put confidence intervals on impulse responses, or standard errors on the steady-state statistics computed below. 
Note that these coefficients in the first row can be partitioned into policy and non-policy components. The coefficients φ xz j and φ xx j described the actual policy rule above used by the central bank to choose instruments x t . As we are interested in the behavior of non-policy variables under alternative policy rules, I remove the actual policy rule from the above system of equations. This is done by replacing each of φ xz j φ xx j with a vector of zeros and φ zx 0 with the identity matrix. These replacements simply construct the equation
The vector W t is simply the vector Y t Y t−1 Y t−2 Y t−3 while the coefficient vector c con-tains the elements φ 0 0 0 0 and u t is just the vector e t 0 0 0 . In addition, any innovation to the policy rule is eliminated through the restriction e x t = 0, affecting the covariance matrix of e t and thus u t .
Optimal monetary policy by the central bank is described by the sequence of instruments x t that minimize the central bank's loss function, described by the quadratic form below.
The vector W * describes the central bank's target for each of the elements of W t , while the matrix Q describes the bank's preferences over the autocovariances of the vector W t . For a diagonal weighting matrix Q, the central bank is interested in minimizing the weighted variance of non-policy and/or policy variables around the target vector W * . The solution to this problem is described in Chow (1975) . Optimal policy is set as a function of lagged policy and non-policy variables.
If a steady-state exists, the optimal policy rule converges as follows,
In practice, given estimates of c and B this solution is derived through an initial guess for H (Q works fine), and iterating until G converges to steady-state.
Plugging this solution into the equation above describes the behavior of non-policy variables under optimal policy.
Define the covariance matrix of 
Σ = V + (B + cG)Σ(B + cG)
In a manner similar to the above, given estimates of B, c, and V and the solution G above, the steady-state covariance is derived through an initial guess for Σ (V works fine) and iterating until Σ converges. Note that the steady-state variance of W t is independent of its mean, which will be
It is of course not only possible to describe the steady-state behavior of our economy under the optimal rule using equation, but actually to do so under any rule. For example, defining the vector
, the steady-state variance of our economy following the actual policy rule would be the solution to this equation.
Existing studies typically compare the actual variance of non-policy variables each the target vector W * . 16 From equation (12) Moreover, the actual variance of the economy is different from the steady-state variance of the economy under the actual policy rule for two reasons: innovations in the actual policy rule and any transition time to the new steady-state. This implies that even if the bank is following an optimal rule, the actual variance of the economy might be greater than the optimal variance. It thus seems appropriate to either compare the steady-state variances of the two policy rules or to simulate the actual variance of optimal policy given initial conditions over the sample period. In order to avoid having to make assumptions about central bank target variables, I choose to compare the steady-state variance of the economy across policy rules in the analysis below.
It is also possible to examine the implications of no feedback rules on steady-state variance by simply replacing G in equation (11) with a matrix of zeros. I also explore the implications of a random policy -where the steady-state variance of the policy instrument is equal to the steady-state variance of the instrument under the actual policy rule, but this variance is distributed randomly. This is done simply through appropriate adjustments to the diagonal elements of policy variables in the covariance matrix V of u t . Under optimal policy these elements were of course set to zero as random innovations to the optimal policy rule are sub-optimal.
Results
I first consider the simple system described above using the federal funds rate as the instrument of monetary policy, then explore a more complicated economy in order to better control for omitted variables that could potentially bias our estimates.
Baseline Economy
Given estimates of the VAR from above, it is straightforward to use the equation (11) in order to compute the steady-state variance of each variable under the optimal policy rule. Table ( 
Another Weighting Matrix
One might be concerned that there are differences between the variance of aggregate income and the variance of aggregate income implied by the variances and covariances of state income. In order to ensure the consistency of the central bank's preferences, I complicate the objective function, recognizing the presence of both aggregate and state income in the vector W t . In order to ensure preferences are consistent, I impose additional restrictions on the form of Q. Note that the change in log of aggregate income can be written as a weighted sum of the change in log of state income.
The vector θ corresponds to the state share of aggregate income while the vector ∆lnY s t corresponds to state output growth. For simplicity, I assume that this share is constant, and write the variance of aggregate output growth as a quadratic form in state output growth and a matrix of state output shares θ. As our system above is written in levels, we need an identity relating the log of aggregate income to the log of state income. To accomplish this I write the difference in logs relative to a base year so that ∆ ln
This normalization permits the above equation to be rewritten as,
In a time-series sense, the first two terms on the right-hand side of this equation are constant, which will disappear when writing the variance of the log of aggregate income as an income-shareweighted sum of the variances and covariances of state income.
It follows that the upper left block of Q must have the following form with a weight of α on the variance of aggregate growth.
One should note that the optimal policy rule could be quite complex given the number of variables in the system. In what follows, even though aggregate variables are unaffected by state variables in the VAR, the optimal policy rule will generally be a function of both aggregate and state variables when using this weighting matrix.
It turns out that results are no different from those in the previous table, implying that there is no difference between the actual and implied aggregate variance in the exercises above.
A Larger VAR
One potentially serious problem with the estimation strategy above the presence of important omitted variables in the system above. As the dynamic response of aggregate and state income to policy generally depends on all of the parameters in the system, a bias created by omitted variables for any one parameter could radically change the conclusions above. In fact, it is well-known that the absence of commodity prices from the above system biases the response of prices to monetary policy such that a monetary contraction actually increases prices. This is one important reason to expand the system.
I simply add commodity prices and consumer confidence to the system above, making only the assumption that confidence and commodity price shocks respond to policy only with a lag.
While this seems natural for commodity prices that are determined in large international markets, also choose to use the weighting matrix described in the previous section to ensure that the implied aggregate volatility of state income matches actual aggregate volatility. The optimal policy rule is characterized in this new economy in Table (6 
Conclusions
So what does this all mean? First, any success that the Federal Reserve has had in reducing aggregate volatility should now be qualified, as it has actually increased volatility for a majority of states representing at least half of aggregate income. Second, it seems possible to design monetary policy to achieve aggregate targets with relatively small distortions, but it is not clear whether or not policy is moving in that direction. Finally, if the main policy instrument used by the central bank has significant imperfections, one might start to ponder if there are alternative or secondary instruments that could meet targets for full employment and price stability at an aggregate and state level. In particular, perhaps through more active use of the discount window at regional banks or by including municipal bonds in open market operations the central bank could more effectively channel demand shocks to the regions that need them the most. In any case, it is a bit troubling that in an economy as integrated as the United States monetary policy has the capacity to create such large distortions, and is an important lesson for countries around the world pondering the costs and benefits of monetary union. 
